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1. Introduction
1.1 Psychology and Economics
Persons make systematic errors in laboratory experiments when asked to perform tasks that
require cognitive skill, such as deciding whether different representations of a policy choice
describe the same problem or a different problem.  Persons act as if they are means/ends rational
when asked to perform tasks in laboratory experiments that test economic theories.
1  The
disjunction between the psychological experiments, in which persons exhibit irrationality, and the
economics experiments, in which persons exhibit as/if rationality, led Vernon Smith to speculate
that the market institution somehow permits mistake prone persons to do as well as rational
calculators.
2  This paper is an early entrant in a literature that pursues Smith’s speculation.
3
 Gode and Sunder began this literature with the question how important is individual
rationality in ensuring that markets reach competitive equilibria.
4  These scholars created an5Gode and Sunder (2004) recently showed that zero intelligence traders reached the
equilibrium that human subjects would reach in price control experiments.
2
experimental auction market.  Their subject buyers could resell any experimental “goods” they
purchased from the subject sellers to the experimenters at a preset price; the buyers thus had an
incentive to minimize the prices they paid.  The sellers had purchased the experimental goods from
the experimenters at a lower preset price, and were then permitted to sell the goods in the
experimental auction, keeping the difference between what they paid the experimenters and what
the buyers bid.  The sellers thus had an incentive to maximize the prices they received.  These
human subjects coordinated on the equilibrium that economic theory predicted would have been
reached by profit maximizing traders facing the same costs and prices.  
 The experimental results thus were consistent with auction theory, but Gode and Sunder
were interested in whether the outcome was driven primarily by the subjects’ rational choices or
the market institution.  To answer this question, they had computers play the same game.  A
computer “seller” could not agree to a sale below the price the experimenters charged the seller for
the goods (the seller’s budget constraint); nor could a computer “buyer” pay more for goods than
the sum the experimenters would pay to repurchase them (the buyer’s budget constraint).  Between
the sellers’ costs – the floor – and the buyer’s limit – the ceiling – the computers generated random
bids and asks.  A sale was concluded when a bid matched an ask.  Gode and Sunder referred to
their computer parties as “zero intelligence traders” because they bid randomly, had no memory
and ignored market rules.  The zero intelligence traders nevertheless reached the equilibrium that
the human subjects reached.  Gode and Sunder concluded that competition and budget constraints
(i.e., one can’t sell below cost) can overcome the effects of irrational behavior completely.
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This view should be taken more as a suggestion than a result for two reasons.  First, Gode
and Sunder studied simple transactions.  Each party, computer or human, had only one unit to buy
or sell, there was only one term in the relevant contract – the price – and exchange was 
immediate.  The experiments do lend plausibility to Vernon Smith’s speculation, however.  If
markets can give competitive deals to irrational parties in simple contexts, perhaps markets will
ameliorate the effects of irrationality in more complex contexts.  Second, and to the contrary, the
human subjects in these experiments pursued an end that was rational in their context; they sought
to maximize monetary payoffs.  The computer players realized this end as well as the human
subjects did.  The economics experiments thus can be taken to suggest that markets can  (partly)
substitute for a lack of means/ends rationality.  It is a separate question whether markets can
prevent persons from pursuing irrational ends. 
1.2 Consumer Heterogeneity Regarding Means and Ends
There is an implicit homogeneity assumption in much of the law review literature.  Persons
(all of them) are victims of the availability heuristic or give different answers to the same question
depending on how the question is framed.  The data contradict the homogeneity assumption. 
Psychologists believe that a successful experimental subject will make the choice that maximizes
her overall well being.  This choice is defined as the “normative response”.  A nontrivial fraction
of subjects in every experiment give the normative  response. 
This “heterogeneity result” arises because – this is the main stream view among
psychologists -- persons may process information with either of two distinct systems.  
A. “System I is viewed as encompassing primarily the processes of interactional
intelligence.  It is automatic, largely unconscious, and relatively undemanding of6Stanovitch (1999) at 2004.
7Stanovitch’s extensive review summarizes the studies (at 66): “... the direction of all of
the correlations displayed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 is consistent with the standard normative models
used by psychologists when interpreting tasks in the reasoning and decision-making literature. 
Individuals giving the normative response in one task tended to give it on another – even when
the task requirements were quite different.  Also, in every single case, cognitive ability was
positively associated with giving the normative response – individuals of higher intelligence
were relatively more likely to give the normative response.  This was equally true for tasks
where the normative response is the subject of great controversy as it was for the relatively
uncontroversial tasks ....”
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computational capacity .... [I]t conjoins properties of automaticity and heuristic processing
.....”
B. “System 2 conjoins the various characteristics that have been viewed as typifying
controlled processing.  System 2 encompasses the processes of analytic intelligence that
have traditionally been studied in psychometric work and that have been examined by
information-processing theorists trying to uncover the computational components
underlying psychometric intelligence.”
6 
Cognitive theory experiments are designed such that one information processing system will yield a
particular response but the other will yield a different response.  The experimenter’s goal is to see
which system governs how subjects will perform the experimental task.  For example, the scenarios
used in framing problems intuitively seem different to subjects – the System 1 response – but
analysis would show that the scenarios actually describe the same problem – the System 2
response.  Subjects whose behavior is controlled by System 2 give the normative response; they are
not misled by how the question is posed.  Subjects whose behavior is controlled by System 1 make
errors.  The data also show that performance on one laboratory task correlates positively with
performance on others: subjects who make mistakes in one context tend to make them in others.
78Rydval and Ortmann (2004); Stanovich and West (2000).
9Chiappe and MacDonald (2005), summarizing studies, state (at 20): “There is evidence
that people with higher g [the score for general intelligence] are better able to reason logically on
a wide variety of tasks, including those in which people are prone to the systematic biases
resulting from the radical contextualization characteristic of human thinking.”
10The percentage of System 2 persons may be somewhat higher in markets than in the
psychological experiments because consumers become familiar with common transactions.  A
recent review summarized studies: “Numerous researchers have shown that dressing it [the
experimental task] in thematic garb, that is, putting it in a social context, increases the
percentage of logically correct answers.”  Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) at 386.
5
The correlation in performance across experiments is plausible.  Subjects who give the
normative response in an experiment score higher in intelligence, as measured by SAT scores, than
subjects who fail to give the normative response; and the former subjects also test higher on such
personal traits as a tendency to intellectualize problems.
8  Since intelligence and personality are
relatively invariant to context, smart, intellectual people make fewer mistakes in general than other
persons.
9   Also, persons do not come to the experimenter wearing signs that identify themselves as
analytic or intuitive.  Rather, when a psychology investigator is interested in who is who, she tests
subjects ex post.  
The psychology results suggest that markets possess two features relevant to the questions
pursued here.  First, market participants also should be heterogenous: there will be “System 2
persons”, who are difficult to fool, and “System 1 persons”, who are more easily misled.
10  Second,
in mass transactions, as in the experiments, it will often be difficult for  sellers and lenders to
identify who is who before a firm offers contracts to consumers.
Firms thus face a complex problem.  A firm would like to present a deal in such fashion as
to cue the System 1 response if consumers exhibiting that response would pay higher prices or
accept less favorable terms than would more analytical consumers.  For example, persons are said11That persons actually discount hyperbolically is becoming controversial.  A good
review is Frederick, et al (2002).
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to be overly optimistic about their future earnings prospects.  Such persons may be willing to accept
harsh lending terms – e.g., a term requiring the cosnumer to mortgage important assets -- that their
more rational selves would reject.  On the other hand, a firm that offers contracts that these System
1 persons will take could lose the business of System 2 persons (they would be put off by the harsh
terms).  Since firms compete for the marginal consumer, and will not always know who that is,
competition among firms for the sophisticated could cause them to ignore the preferences of the
naive.
It will be helpful, in pursuing this possibility, to divide naive consumers into two categories:
those who know their flaws and those who do not.  To see the point of this distinction, begin with
the assumption that many consumers discount the future hyperbolically rather than exponentially. 
A hyperbolic discounter has a higher discount rate between tomorrow and today than she has
between six and five months from today.
11  Now consider a person who in January resolves that for
the next year she will not spend more than $200 each month above the amount required to satisfy
her basic needs.  When March arrives, however, iPods look great to her.  The consumer thus risks
being time inconsistent.  In January, she would like restrict her discretionary spending in the
coming March, but when March arrives she may over consume.
If this illustrative consumer cannot anticipate her later response to temptation, she likely
will depart from her financial plan.  If she is self-aware, however, she may form a preference to pre-
commit not to spend excessively.  The Government facilitates some forms of pre-commitment. 
Thus, Federal law helps persons to pre-commit both by using tax subsidies to encourage the12A search model analyzes competition for “search goods”, which are goods all of whose
features the buyer can observe before purchase.  Color and price thus are search goods while
durability is an “experience good”.  This paper uses a search model because it is interested in the
contracts consumers sign, and a contract, at least in theory, can be read before the consumer
commits to buy.
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creation of IRAs, and by creating penalties for early withdrawal from IRA accounts.  The penalties
reduce the attractiveness to consumers of departing from a life time savings plan.  The IRA
example raises the question whether markets do or could respond to the preference of error prone
but self aware consumers, such as the hyperbolic discounter, to make contracts that would help
them to overcome their errors.
1.3 This Paper
Market competition conceivably could cause firms to respond positively to cognitive error
in two ways: to offer to all consumers the contracts that sophisticated consumers prefer; and to offer
to self aware but error prone consumers contracts that will help these consumers to avoid trouble. 
The question whether actual markets behave in either of these ways poses theoretical and empirical
issues.  Regarding theory, the analysis must be more concrete.  How does competition work when
some consumers are fully rational and others are not?  Regarding empirics, does competition work
in the ways that theory suggests?
This paper takes a theoretical tack.  Part 2 draws from a recently published paper to argue
that firms with market power will offer contracts that maximize the utility of persons who do not
make errors and persons who do but are self aware.  Persons who make errors but are insufficiently
self aware are exploited; they pay supracompetitive prices for bad contracts.  Part 3 next adds
competition to the story by creating a search equilibrium model of competition among firms for
rational and irrational consumers.
12  Part 4 uses the model to argue that, under plausible conditions,13The analysis in Part 2 is drawn from DellaVigna and Malmender (2004).
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competitive markets can reduce the prices naive consumers pay for bad contracts and sometimes
will drive bad contracts out altogether.  Part 5 is a Conclusion that summarizes the results, briefly
illustrates how decision makers could apply them and discusses their normative implications.  
Before beginning, though, attention should be called to an important normative question. 
Cognitive error manifests itself in two ways: (a) the consumer cannot effectively implement her
preferences; (b) the consumer has the wrong preferences (she wants to make contracts she should
not make).  The analysis below, consistently with the Gode and Sunder experiments, argues that
markets sometimes will respond effectively to the first problem.  For example, even naive
consumers would rather pay low than high prices and competition lowers prices.  The question is 
whether markets should respond to error (b).  To see why this question is serious, let market
competition drive out a contract intended for the naive.  This would be unfortunate if the normative
goal were the maximization of persons’ actual preferences; for the preferences of the naive would
have been frustrated.  A full normative analysis of what markets should do is outside this paper’s
scope, but the Conclusion will briefly argue that society should want markets to implement the
consumer’s ideal preferences – the preferences she would have were she sophisticated – rather than
her actual preferences.  If this argument persuades, then markets that respond more to the
sophisticated than to the naive are performing well.  A significant implication of this view holds
that while it now is common to ask how cognitive error can flaw market performance, the decision
maker also should ask whether the market is ameliorating cognitive error or could be helped to do
so.
2. A Monopoly Contracting Model
1314* is the exponential discount rate (* = 1/1+r). 
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2.1 The Model
Consumers face a monopolist who offers a good or a service that is priced with a two part
tariff: a lump sum payment P paid in period one (the period after making the contract) and a per use
fee p that is paid in period two.  A buyer (or borrower) can consume in period 1 or not.  In the first
version of the story, the person who consumes pays the price p and incurs an immediate
consumption cost of v.  Consumption generates a benefit b that is realized in period two.
Consumption thus is costly today but provides a benefit tomorrow (i.e., the current consumption
cost is exercising today at the health club; the future benefit is getting stronger).  The second
version reverses the first: consumption yields a benefit today and a cost tommorow.  Eating
unhealthy food or maxing out on a credit card are examples; there is a later price to be paid. 
Consumers come in three types: (a) A consumer who discounts the future exponentially (she
is time consistent); (b) A consumer who discounts the future hyperbolically, and so will be time
inconsistent, but who knows that she is likely to deviate from her optimal consumption path; and (c)
A consumer who discounts the future hyperbolically but is only partly aware of her weakness.  
Consumer types (a) and  (b) are “sophisticated” while consumer type (c) is “naive”.
Consider first the case where consumption is costly today but yields future benefits.  At t
0,
when a consumer signs a contract, she would like to choose consumption in period one (use the
gym) if the consumption cost is less than the discounted period two benefit minus the period one
user fee.  A time consistent buyer can implement this plan: she consume in t
1 whenever v # *b - p.
14 
A self aware time inconsistent consumer knows that she will choose less period one consumption
than her t
0 self would prefer because at t
1 she will discount the future benefit too heavily; she10
consumes, that is, whenever v # $*b - p where $ represents the extent to which she over-weights
the present (0 # $ < 1).  Using words, this consumer foresees at t
0 that at t
1 the consumption cost v
will weigh more heavily in her utility function relative to the future benefit b than her t
0 self prefers. 
 The smaller is the hyperbolic multiplier $ the greater will be the consumer’s deviation from her t
0
plan.
A naive consumer, in contrast, believes that she is better able to resist temptation than she
actually is.  Consequently, at t
0 she thinks she will make (almost) the same cost/benefit tradeoff in t
1
that she finds preferable at the beginning (she thinks she will be a faithful gym user).  Using
notation, she discounts the future benefit b at $’* where $’ > $.  Therefore, she predicts at t
0 that
she will consume in period one whenever v # $’*b - p.
The firm faces a start up cost of F and a per usage constant marginal cost of c.  It thus earns
the downpayment of P minus F when the consumer signs a contract and p - c if she consumes. The
firm offers consumers a menu of contracts that maximize the firm’s expected profits subject to the
constraint that consumers do at least as well signing contracts as they would do going without the
good or service.
2.2 Analysis
The contract intended for the time consistent consumer sets the user fee p* equal to the
firm’s marginal cost c of providing the good or service.  Marginal cost pricing ensures that this
consumer engages in consumption whenever consumption would generate positive surplus
(whenever the current consumption cost v is less than the discounted future benefit (*b - p).   The
firm offers this efficient contract because, being a monopolist, it is able to capture the surplus the
consumer derives from optimal use by charging a high down payment.11
The time inconsistent but self aware consumer (she knows she will discount future benefits
at $*) would like to pre-commit to consume appropriately in period 1 (to use the health club as
often as she should).  The contract intended for this consumer sets the use fee p below the firm’s
marginal cost (p* < c) in order to encourage consumption, making up for the resultant loss by
further raising the down payment P.  This self aware consumer will realize that the large down
payment buys the pre-commitment – the low per use fee –  that she needs.  The firm offers pre-
commitment contracts because it earns the same (monopoly) profit selling to self aware consumers
that the firm earns when selling to time consistent consumers. 
The naive consumer does poorly, however.  The contract intended for her requires a very
high downpayment and charges a use fee that is below but close to marginal cost.  This consumer
believes, at t
0, that she will consume more than she actually will and so she is willing to make the
high down payment in order to profit from the relatively low fee on the many uses she (incorrectly)
expects to make.  Put another way, she overpays up front but will not recover the overpayment
through optimal consumption later on.
 A time consistent consumer will choose the optimal consumption path for the second model
category: goods or services whose use generates a benefit in period one but a cost in period two.  A
self aware time inconsistent consumer knows that she is likely to over consume in period one (to
max out on a credit card or to eat too much unhealthy food)  relative to the consumption path she
prefers at t
0.  This consumer now wants to pre-commit not to consume excessively.   The contract
intended for her requires a lower down payment than the time consistent consumer pays, but sets
the use fee above marginal cost.  The high use fee is set to deter period one consumption, and thus15This consumer would not later switch to a low marginal cost provider because the seller
is a monopolist; there is no other provider.
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satisfies the consumer’s desire to pre-commit not to over consume.
15  Under the same logic, the
contract intended for the naive consumer, who underestimates how much she will later consume,
has a very high downpayment and a use fee above marginal cost but lower than the fee the self
aware consumer pays.  The naive consumer thus is insufficiently deterred from excessive
consumption.
This analysis concerns two kinds of error: overconfidence and hyperbolic discounting (i.e.,
weakness of will).  The results, however, likely generalize to some other cognitive mistakes.  For
example, consumers who know they are prey to the availability heuristic may pay firms to provide
probability data; self aware boundedly rational consumers may pay for simple contracts.  And to
summarize, when consumers face a seller with market power, the seller will offer efficient contracts
to sophisticated consumers and to consumers who are aware of their tendency to make cognitive
mistakes.  The seller, however, exploits naive consumers in two dimensions: it extracts all of the
surplus that its contracts generate, and the contracts themselves are inefficient.  Can the market do
better when firms are added to the selling side?
3. A Search Model
 3.1    The Identification Problem and the Social Goal
There is an initial question what an “irrational contract” is.  To understand the question, let
the market offer two categories of product: safe and unsafe.  A decision maker who can distinguish
between them should ban the unsafe product.  If, then, one contract type is always preferred by
irrational consumers and never chosen by rational consumers, and if the consumer’s ideal16As an example, every consumer type could prefer a narrow warranty, depending on its
price, but consumers who are excessively optimistic about a product’s performance will prefer a
narrow warranty to a broad one, cet par, because they underestimate their need for insurance.
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preferences should rule, the decision maker should proscribe the irrational choice.  There is no
point to asking whether the market would eliminate an irrational contract because its existence
alone answers the question.  
Thus this paper can be rescued from triviality only by considering contracts that would be
purchased by every consumer type – rational, knowingly irrational, unknowingly irrational – if a
contract is made attractive enough, but it would be a mistake for some consumer types to buy
particular versions of some contract types.  As an example, consider a lending agreement with a
relatively low interest rate, a high late fee and a broad security interest.  A consumer who
underestimates the probability of default – she is over confident regarding her earning prospects –
may borrow under the contract because she mistakenly believes that the lender will never assess
the late fee or foreclose on the security interest.  A consumer with the same default probability, but
who correctly apprehends it, will reject the contract because for her the harsh consequences
attendent on default outweigh the contract’s low interest rate.  On the other hand, there likely is an
interest rate sufficiently low to induce this rational consumer to accept the contract despite its
harsh consequences.  Similarly, there likely is an interest rate sufficiently high to cause the naive
consumer to reject the contract.  For this paper’s purposes, then, a “naive contract” has two
features: (a) It is a contract that every consumer type could want; and (b) In a sense to be made
precise below, it is preferred by certain consumers in consequence of the biases from which they
suffer.
16
On this view, a market analysis may be necessary.   This is because naive contracts are17Because biases can partially or completely offset, correcting one bias in isolation risks
causing consumers to make worse choices.  See Besharov, supra note 3.  Thus, the task of bias
correction may require the decision maker to make an all things considered analysis.  Also, some
biases that experiments identify may be adaptive in life or overcome by persons’ self protective
strategies. See authorities cited infra notes 30 and 31.  Therefore, there always is a question
when an experimentally identified bias is real.  The topic of government responses to bias is
revisited in Part 5.3.
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difficult to regulate.  If a contract type can be both rationally and irrationally preferred, banning it
must frustrate the preferences of many consumers.  A possible response to this concern is to ban
contracts that “a lot” of irrational consumers buy.  This response would be hard to implement,
however, because there is no convenient “contract/cognitive test”.  An agency or court cannot
easily learn just what portion of potential customers for a particular contract are able to solve the
cognitive challenges that the contract poses.  Another policy response would be to correct the
possibly applicable biases themselves, but this too would be hard to do.
17  The discussion of the
monopoly model suggests that the decision maker should look at the market before attempting it. 
In that model, rational and self aware irrational consumers could distinguish good from bad deals. 
This makes salient the question whether competition for the business of these consumers could help
the naive.  If so, the regulator would face the relatively easier tasks of identifying and remedying
market failure.
The model analyzed below assumes for convenience that firms may specialize in consumer
types.  Consumer finance companies, for example, may be more likely than banks to offer contracts
that appeal to the naive.  The ability of firms to specialize is captured below by supposing that some
firms offer “sophisticated contract packages” while other firms offer naive contract packages.  All
consumer types in the model will purchase both contract types, depending on their relative prices. 
The questions pursued are whether competition can reduce the prices of these contracts to15
competitive levels, and whether naive contracts could be driven out altogether.  A little more should
be said about how these inquiries relate to each other.
Naive contracts may advance a consumer’s self interest.  To illustrate, a consumer who is
led through excessive optimism to underestimate the probability that a product is defective will buy
a less comprehensive warranty than she should buy.  Claims under limited warranties can be
valuable, however.  A market for warranties is competitive if the price of a warranty equals the
firm’s cost of providing it.  Because narrow warranties – i.e., “wrong warranties” –  are not useless,
naive consumers are better off if competition causes wrong warranties to be priced at cost.  Naive
consumers may be worse off, however, if competition causes wrong warranties to disappear
altogether.  In this event, naive consumers either will buy broader but less preferred warranties or
not trade.  Competition thus has ambiguous welfare effects if the goal is to satisfy actual consumer
preferences.  This issue is best pursued after an analysis of how competition could work.
3.2 A Search Model
A firm can sell a contract, denoted Xs, that is intended for sophisticated consumers, or a
contract, denoted Xn, that is intended for naive consumers.  A contract is a set of terms that define a
loan or other consumer purchase.  The monopoly model described above analyzed three categories
of contract, each intended for a different consumer type, but it will be convenient here to put
sophisticated and mistaken but self aware consumers in the same category; the Xs contract is
intended for these types.  Firms cannot tell which consumers are naive and which are sophisticated,
but they know the distribution of consumer types.  The assumption that a consumer’s type is private
information is made largely for realism.  Though firms sometimes can gather substantial
demographic data about their customers, the relation between such data and the presence of bias is18See Ronnlund, et al (2005).  The assumption that consumer types are private
information is also made to restrict the analysis.  The model here does not apply when a firm can
learn, on a person by person basis, who suffers from bias in time to offer exploitative contracts to
the naive.  
19The fixed cost assumption may seem unrealistic because, it is said, firms can exploit
biases easily.  A common example is the practice of requiring consumers to return unsatisfactory
products.  Consumers subject to the endowment effect allegedly will find return more costly than
initial rejection, or a subsidized return, and so are exploited.  See Sovern (2004).  The literature,
however, offers few other examples of simple exploitation.  Also, the endowment effect turns out
to be more an experimental artifact than a real phenomenon.  See Plott and Zeiler (2005).  In any
event, the fixed cost assumption makes it marginally more likely that firms will sell the
sophisticated contract than the naive contract but the restrictive search cost assumption, to be set
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very crude.  For example, consumers who make more than $100,000 a year apparently are neither
more nor less likely to discount hyperbolically than consumers who make between $50,000 and
$99,000 a year.  Also, consumers’ susceptibility to framing effects is invariant to age.
18
In the model, firms have a fixed cost Fi (i = s or n), produce at a constant marginal cost of ci
over some range [0, zi] and produce at an infinite marginal cost thereafter (zi thus is the firm’s
capacity constraint).  A firm’s average cost for offering a package is AC(Xi) = (Fi/q) + ci, where q is
output.  The competitive price for a contract, which has each firm pricing contracts at average cost
and selling up to capacity, thus is pi* =  ACi(Xi)(zi) = (Fi/zi) + ci.   
It is assumed equally costly to sell both contract types (cn = cs), but that it is more costly for
a firm to set up an exploitative system than an efficient system.  The motivation for this fixed cost
assumption is that it apparently is more complex for a firm to find the standard form contract that
best exploits the numerous, possibly partially offsetting biases to which consumers are prone than it
is for a firm to choose the terms that a utility maximizing consumer would accept.  Firms also risk
the lack of enforcement or liability under consumer protection statutes if their contracts too
obviously exploit.
19  Because Fn > Fs while firms sell at the same marginal cost, the competitiveout immediately below, makes it marginally less likely that firms will sell the sophisticated
contract.  Hence, the fixed cost assumption is not crucial to what follows.
20Nonsequential search – using a fixed sample size – is attractive for several reasons. 
First, it is optimal when the outcome of search is observed with delay.  For example, people
often apply for several jobs at once rather than apply for a job and apply for another only after
rejection.  Also, when there are fixed costs to shop it often is best to visit a shopping district,
spreading the cost over several store visits.  Finally, using a fixed sample size is attractive to risk
averse consumers because there is a serious danger of stopping too soon or too late when using a
sequential search strategy against an unknown price distribution.
21This assumption is consistent with the result that the principal determinant of search
intensity in search theory experiments is search costs.  See, e.g., Grether, et al (1992).
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price for the naive contract exceeds the competitive price for the sophisticated contract (i.e., pn* >
ps*).  There are Y total firms in the market, where Ys sell the sophisticated contract Xs and Yn sell
the naive contract Xn (Ys + Yn = Y).
Consumers are partitioned in two ways.  First, some consumers make cognitive errors
without realizing they do so – they are naive – and some do not make errors or are self aware – they
are sophisticated.  Using notation, there are Bs sophisticated consumers in the market and Bn naive
consumers, where Bs + Bn = B, the total number of consumers.  Persons also are partitioned
according to their shopping behavior.  B1 in number consumers – the nonshoppers – visit only one
firm before purchasing.  B2 in number consumers visit n = 2 firms and then purchase the most
attractive contract they see.  A sample size of two is chosen for convenience.
20  Let Prs be the
probability that a sophisticated consumer shops, and Prn be the probability that a naive consumer
shops.  Then the number of shoppers is B2 = PrsBs + PrnBn, with B1 defined similarly.  However,
there seems no reason to suppose that naive consumers are less interested in low prices than
sophisticated consumers are.
21  On this view, it is assumed here that Prs = Prn = P, the probability
that any consumer engages in comparison shopping.  Firms cannot tell which consumers shop or18
not.  
The consumer purchases one product/contract package if the price is below her “limit
price”, to be defined below, or she does not purchase.  She prefers the contract Xi if she would
choose Xi after seeing both contracts selling at their competitive prices.  To understand this concept
of a preference, begin by assuming that a sophisticated consumer will purchase the contract Xs at
any price up to a common limit price of ls.  Next recall that consumers will purchase their less
preferred contract if the price of their preferred contract is too high.  A sophisticated consumer thus
also will purchase the naive contract Xn at any price up to a common limit price of lsn.  Similarly, a
naive consumer will purchase Xn at any price up to a common limit price of ln, and will purchase Xs
at any price up to a common limit of lns.  These limit prices are referred to as a consumer’s
“willingness to pay” for a contract type.  A sophisticated consumer who sees the contracts Xs and
Xn priced competitively would purchase Xs if  ls - ps* > lsn - pn*, where the left hand side of this
inequality is the expected surplus the consumer would get from purchasing Xs and the right hand
side is the expected surplus she would get from purchasing Xn, both at their competitive prices. 
Rearranging terms, the sophisticated consumer would purchase Xs if pn* - ps* > lsn - ls. 
Sophisticated consumers probably have a greater willingness to pay for the sophisticated contract
than for the naive contract (ls > lsn).   On this assumption, the right hand side of this inequality is
negative.  Since the left hand side is positive, the inequality always is satisfied: a sophisticated
consumer who sees both contracts priced competitively will purchase the sophisticated contract. 
The same reasoning implies that the naive consumer will purchase the naive contract if she sees
both contracts priced competitively.  Because the naive consumer is partly deluded, however, it
cannot be said a priori whether her limit price for her preferred contract, ln,, exceeds the limit price22Some biases moderate with experience.  For example, Van Den Steen (2004) states (at
1141): “The [overconfidence] bias also increases in a mean-preserving spread of the distribution
of prior beliefs, but it tends to disappear with sufficient experience with the particular choice
problem.”  Also, experience substantially improves persons’ ability to do Baysian reasoning. 
See Harrison (1994); Camerer (1990).
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of the sophisticated consumer for her preferred contract, ls.  Part 4 considers both possibilities.
A little more should be said about when consumers will purchase their less preferred
contract.  It is convenient to explain switching between contracts by focusing initially on the the
naive consumer.  She will purchase the sophisticated contract Xs if she sees both contract types but
the price for Xn is “too high”.  The cutoff price for Xn, above which the naive consumer would
purchase Xs, is referred to as the switching price.  Recalling that the naive consumer’s willingness
to pay for the sophisticated contract is lns, a naive consumer who purchases Xs at its competitive
price of ps* earns an expected surplus of lns - ps*.  She will reject the naive contract Xn if she would
earn at least as much surplus purchasing Xs at ps* than she would earn by purchasing Xn at the
switching price.  Denoting this price pn(a), the naive consumer who sees both contract types will
buy Xs when  . Letting this be an equality and rearranging terms lpl p a ns s n n −≥ − *( )
yields the switching price for Xn:  pn(a) = ln - lns + ps*.  The price at which the sophisticated
consumer switches to Xn is derived similarly.
This description of the model apparently implies that naivety is a generic quality: a
consumer is naive or she is not.  Naivety would be context dependent, however, if consumers are
more sophisticated about some contracts or contract terms than others.  For example, consumers
may make fewer mistakes regarding the warranty term than the prepayment penalty term because
over time consumers become familiar with the need for warranty protection.
22  That consumer20
sophistication may vary with context could affect the results reached below in two ways.  First, the
less naive a consumer is the more she will pay for the sophisticated contract Xs because she will
(partially) recognize its virtues.  In the notation used here, the limit price of naive consumers for the
sophisticated contract, lns, increases as consumer sophistication increases.   When lns goes up, the
switching price pn(a) that will induce the naive consumer to reject the contract intended for her – Xn
-- goes down.   The lower is the naive switching price, Part 4 shows, the more effective comparison
shopping is at lowering the price that sellers can charge for Xn.  Second, the less naive a consumer
is, the lower will be her willingness to pay for the naive contract.  Part 4 will argue, in turn, that
when sophisticated consumers have a greater willingness to pay for the sophisticated contract than
naive consumers have for the naive contract, or the willingnesses to pay are close, the market for
the naive contract is more likely to disappear.  
Finally, a firm is said to have a “comparative advantage” at selling one of the two contract
types considered here if the firm needs fewer customers to break even – to recover its fixed cost –
selling that contract type than selling the other type. The number of consumers a firm needs to break
even is  , where i = s or n.  Thus, a firm would have a comparative advantage, denoted 8s, at
selling the contract Xs if
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As will become apparent, when firms have a comparative advantage at selling one contract type, the
market is less likely to offer the other contract type.23Though the interest rate for Xs in the illustration is higher than the interest rate for Xn,
the total cost of Xs to the consumer is lower because of the more favorable default terms.
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This model applies to many of the cognitive errors that are assumed to affect consumers
commercially.  For example, a naive consumer may be overconfident or optimistic about her ability
to pay off a loan.  Because her true odds of default are higher than her perceived odds of default, she
will accept more draconian default terms in return for a low interest rate than a sophisticated
consumer with her default profile would take.  A contract with these harsh terms is denoted Xn here. 
On the other hand, if the interest rate on the loan becomes too high, this consumer would switch to a
contract with an even higher interest rate but less onerous penalties for nonpayment.  The contract
with these softer terms is denoted Xs.
23
4. Analysis
4.1 Pricing Decisions
It is helpful to begin by assuming that firms are selling both contract types at their
competitive prices.  Would a firm selling the naive contract Xn deviate from the competitive
equilibrium?  Two deviations are possible: in the price dimension, from pn* to a higher price; and in
the “quality” dimension, from Xn to the sophisticated contract Xs.  Beginning with price deviations,
first consider a deviation to the limit price ln.  The firm would then sell only to naive nonshoppers if 
the willingness to pay of the sophisticated consumer for the naive contract is less than the
willingness to pay of the naive consumer for the naive contract (i.e., lsn < ln).  This is a plausible
condition so sophisticated nonshoppers will reject Xn at its limit price.  A naive shopper would see
either the package Xn selling elsewhere at its competitive price pn* or the package Xs selling at its24To show this, recall that pn(a) = ln - lns + ps*.  That  ln > lns implies that pn(a) > ps*.
22
competitive price ps*.   Since ps* is below the switching price of pn(a)
24, neither naive nor
sophisticated shoppers would purchase Xn at ln.
The firm would not deviate from a competitive equilibrium to the limit price if a deviation
would yield non-positive profits.  This equilibrium condition is expressed as
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The term in the parenthesis on the left hand side of this expression is the surplus the firm would earn
from the deviation (ln
  - cn); the second term is expected demand from the naive nonshoppers.  The
expression can be rewritten as
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A deviation to the highest price for the naive contract thus would not occur if (a) Many naive
consumers comparison shop (P is high); (b) Consumers have a low willingness to pay for the naive
contract (ln is low); or (c) The fixed costs of setting up an exploitative system are high (Fn is big). 
The intuition underlying condition (a) is obvious.  The intuition underlying condition (b) is that the
firm gains less from charging consumers the limit price when the limit is low.  Regarding condition
(c), the greater are the fixed costs of creating the naive contract, the more naive nonshoppers the
firm needs to recover these costs.
 The presence of sophisticated consumers reduces the likelihood that firms will charge
excessive prices for the naive contract.  To see why, realize that when firms sell the sophisticated
contract Xs at its competitive price, they restrict the ability of other firms to price Xn at its limit. 
This is because the Xn limit price is greater than the switching price of pn(a) so a naive shopper will23
either buy Xn if she visits a firm that prices it competitively, or she will buy Xs if her other draw is
from a firm offering it.  Firms could not sell Xs, however, unless there were sophisticated consumers
to buy it.  Hence, the presence of sophisticated consumers helps to protect naive consumers from
being maximally exploited in the price dimension.
  A firm also could deviate from a competitive equilibrium to the lower switching price pn(a). 
The firm would not sell to sophisticated shoppers.  This consumer’s two draws will reveal at least
one firm selling the contract Xs priced competitively, or one firm selling the contract Xn priced
competitively.  Whether this firm would sell to sophisticated nonshoppers depends on whether the
most such consumers would pay for the naive package (lsn) exceeds pn(a), the switching price for
naive consumers.  The firm would not sell to a naive shopper whose other visit was to a firm selling
the naive contract at its competitive price.  On the other hand, the deviant firm would sell to naive
nonshoppers and to naive shoppers whose other visit was to a firm selling Xs.   A firm selling Xn
would earn non-positive profits from a deviation to the switching price if it did not sell to
sophisticated nonshoppers and if
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The first term in Expression (2) is the firm’s expected demand from naive nonshoppers and
the second term is expected demand from naive shoppers.  Each of them visits two firms so the
probability that a shopper will visit a firm offering Xn at the switching price is one half, which
explains the fraction in the second term.  That there is this additional term apparently makes
Expression (2) harder to satisfy than (1): that is, a firm selling Xn at pn* is more likely to deviate to
the switching price for Xn than to the limit price.  This result is strengthened if the firm also would24
sell to sophisticated nonshoppers.  On the other hand, if the naive consumers’ willingness to pay for
Xs, lns, is relatively high, then pn(a) will be low, making the right hand side of Expression (2) large. 
Then (2) will become easy to satisfy; the firm does better pricing Xn competitively than deviating to
a higher price.  The intuition for this result was introduced above: When the switching price for Xn is
low, the gain to the firm from charging it – (pn(a) - cn) – is more likely to be below the cost –  the
loss of the naive shoppers who visit another firm selling Xn competitively.  Thus, as consumer
naivety falls, comparison shopping is more effective at producing competitive prices.
This analysis of the seller’s pricing decision can be summarized in 
Proposition One: The presence of sophisticated consumers in a market, and the penchant of
both sophisticated and naive consumers to comparison shop, both increase the likelihood that firms
will price naive contracts competitively.
Remark 1: Competition is beneficial in two ways.  First, competition will ameliorate or
eliminate the redistribution of wealth from consumers to firms.  When Xn is competitively priced,
naive consumers realize the full surplus from buying it (ln - pn*).  Second, when firms earn rents
from noncompetitive pricing, new firms will enter the market to compete those rents away.  As a
consequence, though all firms come to earn zero pure profits the market will have too many firms. 
This inefficiency is reduced as market pricing becomes more competitive because then fewer firms
will enter.  Finally, the model assumes for convenience that consumers engage in the minimum
amount of search; shoppers visit only two firms.  If consumers search more extensively, the
beneficial effects of competition would be enhanced.
Remark 2: Remark 1 suggests that the number of firms is sensitive to the search strategies of
consumers, but the model holds the number of firms fixed.  This strategy is innocuous because the25Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) develop this logic when analyzing market
outcomes in a model where consumers buy a homogenous good using a nonsequential search
strategy.
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model’s logic holds independently of the exact number of firms.  A firm sells to a consumer either
because the consumer does not compare prices, the firm’s price is the lowest the consumer sees, or
(in an ideal world) the consumer searches costlessly and the firm has the lowest price in the market. 
If only two firms exist, having the lowest price is identical to charging a lower price than the
competitor.  This is also true, however, when there are infinitely many firms because the chance of
being the lowest price firm in the market is negligible.  In the limit, then, a firm behaves as if it is
competing with just one firm for the business of shoppers.  Consumers who understand firms’
incentives respond by adjusting their search strategies such that the equilibrium price distributions
do not depend on the number of firms.
25
Remark 3: The contracting ideal, among scholars, is the “dickered term”: the portion of the
agreement whose content is codetermined.  Dickering has less appeal when firms can use the
bargaining process to learn whether consumers are mistake prone.  Firms then could exploit the
naive while offering good terms to the sophisticated.  In contrast, in the model here the selling side
drafts every term but firms cannot identify particular consumers by type.  Proposition One thus
suggests that consumers can be better off with anonymity plus competition than with the opportunity
to bargain over terms.
Remark 4: Proposition One nevertheless may appear to describe an inefficient outcome.  To
see why, suppose that naive consumers somehow became sophisticated.  Then, the most they would
pay for the naive contract would be lsn which was shown above to be less than ls.  Since the
competitive price for the naive contract exceeds the competitive price for the sophisticated contract,26Denote the price at which a sophisticated consumer would buy the naive contract as
ps(a).  Then, recalling the derivation of the naive consumer’s switching price, the switching price
for the sophisticated consumer is ps(a) = ls - lsn + pn*, and the logic of note 21 holds here..
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every consumer who saw both contracts priced competitively would realize that the sophisticated
contract generates greater expected surplus and buy it.  Thus, that both contract types are sold
appears inefficient.  Recall from Part 1.3 above, however, that if the naive are not “converted”, they
would be buying their preferred contract at its lowest price in the competitive two contract type
equilibrium; the equilibrium, that is, would be efficient on the normative benchmark of actual
preferences.  Remark 8 below pursues this issue further.
4.2 Contracting decisions
A second issue is whether the market for the naive contract could disappear altogether
though naive consumers exist.  A firm selling the contract Xn at its competitive price could deviate
to selling the contract Xs at its limit price or at some lower price.  A firm that deviated to ls would
serve only sophisticated nonshoppers.  The firm could not sell to naive shoppers, who would either
see Xs or Xn priced competitively at another firm, both of which they would prefer.  The firm also
would not sell to naive nonshoppers because their willingness to pay for the sophisticated contract is
assumed to be less than the willingness to pay of sophisticated consumers for that contract (i.e., lns <
ls).  Finally, the firm would not sell to sophisticated shoppers because their other draw would be
either to a firm selling Xs priced competitively or Xn priced competitively.  The latter price is below
the sophisticated consumer’s switching price.
26  Hence, a deviation from selling the naive contract at
pn* to selling the sophisticated contract at its limit price would earn non-positive profits if
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sophisticated contract at its competitive price because the firm realizes no surplus in any
competitive equilibrium.
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The important question is whether Expression (3) is harder to satisfy than Expression (1)
(i.e., whether a firm is more likely to offer the sophisticated contract at its limit price than the naive
contract at its limit price).  The left hand side of (3) would be larger than the left hand side of (1) --
deviations to Xs would be more likely -- if there were more sophisticated consumers than naive
consumers.  Also, the right hand side of Expression (1) is 8n, a firm’s comparative advantage at
selling the naive contract, and the right hand side of Expression (3) is 8s, a firm’s comparative
advantage at selling the sophisticated contract.  Hence, if 8s < 8n, the right hand side of (3) would be
smaller than the right hand side of (1).  In this event, a firm originally offering the naive contract
would be more likely to deviate in both the price dimension and the quality dimension: the firm, that
is, would rather sell the sophisticated contract at its limit price than the naive contract at its limit
price.
The marginal cost of selling both contract types is assumed to be the same, but the fixed
costs of selling the naive contract are higher than the fixed costs of selling the sophisticated contract. 
Thus, firms will have a comparative advantage at selling the sophisticated contract if sophisticated
consumers have a higher willingness to pay for Xs than naive consumers have a willingness to pay
for Xn (i.e.,  ls > ln); or if the two willingnesses to pay are sufficiently close. 
Next consider a deviation from Xn to Xs at the switching price of ps(a.)
27  The analysis of this
deviation is similar to the analysis for the naive switching price above.  A firm that deviates to
selling the sophisticated contract Xs at its switching price would sell to sophisticated nonshoppers, to
sophisticated shoppers whose other draw was at a firm selling the naive contract Xn and to naive28
nonshoppers if their willingness to pay for the sophisticated contract (lns) exceeded the sophisticated
switching price.  The firm thus is more likely to deviate to selling the sophisticated contract at its
switching price than at its limit price.  
This analysis of contracting decisions is summarized in 
Proposition Two: Competition may drive naive contracts from the market.  This outcome is
more likely to occur if there are many sophisticated consumers, if both naive and sophisticated
consumers comparison shop, if sophisticated consumers have a relatively high willingness to pay for
contracts intended for them and if naive consumers have a relatively low willingness to pay for
contracts intended for them.
Remark 5: The analysis shows that a firm selling Xn may deviate to Xs at its limit or its
switching price.  No values in Expression (3) change if one firm deviates, however, so if it pays one
firm to deviate, it will pay many firms to deviate.  Since all firms in the original assumed
equilibrium were pricing Xs competitively, there may be price dispersion in the Xs market. 
Equilibria with price dispersion are common when search is costly and goods are heterogenous.
Remark 6: A number of biases, such as over confidence and the endowment effect, dissipate
with experience.  This suggests that naivety is less common or weaker in markets in which
consumers buy or borrow frequently.  The less naive a consumer is, the lower is her willingness to
pay for the naive contract and the higher is her willingness to pay for the sophisticated contract. 
Common transactions thus are more likely to be conducted under sophisticated contracts.
Remark 7: In the model, sophisticated consumers will buy contracts intended for the naive. 
A plausible alternate specification holds that sophisticated consumers never would purchase naive
contracts because they would recognize the contracts’ exploitative nature.  On this specification,29
naive contracts are more likely to disappear than in the analysis here because firms offering naive
contracts could not sell to sophisticated consumers at any price.  A possibly more realistic
assumption is that sophisticated consumers will purchase some naive contract types but not others. 
The rejected contracts may be the most exploitative.
Remark 8: Eliminating naive contracts would be undesirable if actual consumer preferences
are the normative benchmark.  When firms sell the sophisticated contract at its limit price, no naive
consumers would purchase; and when firms sell the sophisticated contract at its switching price,
naive consumers would buy it only if their limit price for that contract exceeds the switching price
(lns > ps(a)).  Recalling that naive consumers get surplus from the contract intended for them,
competition that eliminates the naive contract creates welfare losses.  
5. Conclusion
5.1 Summary
Consumers may be partitioned in three ways: some consumers do not make cognitive errors;
some consumers are error prone, but know they are; and some consumers are error prone but think
they are not.  Theory shows that firms with market power will offer contracts that are optimal for the
first two consumer types but which exploit the third.  Naive consumers are offered naive – that is,
bad – contracts, and pay monopoly prices for them.  The first result carries over when market
competition is introduced on the selling side: firms will offer optimal contracts to rational and to self
aware consumers.  The second result may change, however.  Though naive consumers may still be
offered bad contracts, those contracts are less likely to be sold at monopoly prices.  Also, firms
sometimes will offer good contracts to every consumer type.  The intuition underlying these results
now is easy to state: If some consumers are sophisticated while others are naive but firms cannot tell28This is a familiar problem in utilitarian theory.  Williams (1985), at 88, thus argued that
government can reduce utility if it implements idealized preferences but persons never come to
have those preferences.
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into which class a consumer falls, and if all consumer types will shop for low prices and preferred
contracts, then competition among firms for the marginal consumer will lower the price of every
contract type.   Further, if there are enough sophisticated consumers, and if the other consumers are
not very naive – they have a relatively low willingness to pay for bad contracts --, only good
contracts will exist in equilibrium.
5.2 Normative issues
Driving out naive contracts may be thought morally problematic.  If naive consumers do not
lose their errors, they will experience welfare losses if competition causes their preferred contract to
disappear.
28  There are two arguments, briefly sketched here, that these losses should not count. 
Both hold that the consumer’s idealized preferences – those she would have were she sophisticated –
should control.   The first argument is in a Rawlsian vein, and goes like this: Consider a person who
knows that she will be a consumer during her adult life but does not know if she will turn out to be
sophisticated or naive.  She is told to assume the following: (a) She may be a sophisticated consumer
or a naive consumer; (b) If (or when) she is sophisticated, she would purchase the sophisticated
contract, had she a choice, because that contract would maximize her expected monetary return; (c)
Her consumption choices affect only herself.  Would she prefer the market to increase the difficulty
of making naive choices or be neutral toward those choices?   Assumption (b) implies that at every
time in her life, and at the end, she would have more wealth if she acted on sophisticated preferences
than if she acted on naive preferences.  Assumption (c) implies that she would not increase the
chance that naive contracts would be sold were she to forego wealth in order to become a customer29Persons exhibit altruistic preferences when playing experimental demand games: the
demander tends to choose what she regards as the fair share of the sum the players are to divide
rather than the much larger payoff her power in the game could command.  The demander,
however, knows the payoff of the other player precisely, and knows that she can entirely
determine that payoff.  That both players know that the demander has both power and perfect
knowledge supports either of two inferences: the demander actually is altruistic or the demander
fears a hostile rejection of greedy offers.  Schmitt (2004) supports the latter interpretation and
Camerer (2003) at 115 summarizes studies showing that when persons play market games,
where they do not know the payoffs of other players and cannot affect those payoffs, altruistic
preferences disappear. 
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for naive contracts.  The three assumptions together thus imply that she would prefer the market to
make naive preferences more difficult to satisfy.
Respecting the realism of the last two assumptions, sophisticated contracts will generally
increase the consumer’s expected wealth relative to naive contracts.  Thus, the right debt contract
reduces the consumer’s bankruptcy risk while the wrong one may increase it, and the right warranty
contract reduces the risk that the consumer will have to pay the full price for defective goods while
the wrong warranty contract leaves that risk relatively untouched.  Assumption (b) thus seems
correct.  Assumption (c) also holds because, in the mass markets considered here, a particular
consumer’s choice of a naive contract would not materially increase the availability of that contract
for other consumers.  Markets, that is, make the pursuit of altruistic preferences largely futile.
29 
 Original position arguments rest on the premise that persons in the original position are
relevantly alike.  The argument here rests on the same premise.  It supposes everyone to prefer more
to less, ceteris paribus, and contends that in large markets the ceteris paribus condition holds.
The second argument for counting only consumers’ ideal preferences is more directly
utilitarian.  It claims, simply, that the preferences a utilitarian should sum must be worth summing. 
There can be considerable controversy as which preferences belong in the “summable set”, but an30Besharov, supra note 3.  Also, overconfidence helps to overcome anxiety about whether
one can do a task.  See Compte and Postlewaite (2004).  For other examples, pessimistic
consumers who make overly high projections of future consumption needs may not under-save, 
Rabin (1999), and the self-serving bias, to the extent it actually exists, may be adaptive.  Kaplan
and Ruffle (2004).  See also Krueger and Funder (2004) at 319: “As soon as one asks whether
changes in one bias may result in changes in others, one moves toward a more comprehensive
model.”
31A decision maker also may have to consider the efforts of persons to overcome biases
through internal systems of control.  Considerable evidence exists that a person forms her self
image by inducting the kind of person she is from her past actions.  Because persons have
32
argument that the set should include irrational preferences is hard to make.
5.3 Applications
Market responses to cognitive error also can be malign: bad contracts and high prices likely
exist.  This raises difficult questions for decision makers because whether an actual contract is good
or bad depends on context and consumers’ cognitive styles: the same contract could be optimal for
some consumers and suboptimal for others.  The two immediate implications of this possibility are
that the existence of several contract types in a market cannot itself demonstrate that cognitive error
is pervasive, and that banning particular contract types would usually frustrate the preferences of
many consumers.  A second policy response is to correct disadvantaging biases.  Apart from
consumer education in schools, this response is difficult to implement: that biases may offset implies
that the task of bias correction makes great informational demands on the decision maker.  As an
example, present oriented persons may choose suboptimal effort levels when pursuing projects with
delayed payoffs.  A person who is excessively confident of his ability to control outcomes, however,
may overcome this bad incentive if his misplaced optimism causes him to overrate the probability of
success.
30  When offsetting errors are welfare enhancing, correcting one error must be welfare
reducing.  This suggests that the task of bias correction is best conducted holistically.
31   But thenimperfect recall (they cannot fully evaluate the wisdom of past choices), they develop “personal
rules” to guide behavior.  It is easier to recall whether one violated a rule.  The cost of violating a
rule may be large: missing a scheduled exercise day will reduce fitness only by a little but may
contribute substantially to the person’s view that she really is slothful.  That perception, in turn,
may cause the person to miss a lot of exercise days.  Soman and Cheema (2004) provide
evidence of this phenomenon.  Their evidence suggests that a person who fears she suffers from
weakness of will may develop a saving rule that she is quite reluctant to break.  Benabou and
Tirole (2004) formalize this idea in a model which shows, among other things, “that agents with
hyperbolic discounting can actually behave as though they overweighed the future rather than
the present.”  (at 850; emphasis in original).  That persons exhibit inconsistent discount rates in
experiments thus should not, of itself, lead a decision maker to conclude that people are time
inconsistent when they make real world choices.  Evidence regarding what people actually do is
difficult for institutions such as courts to obtain, however.
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there are large and difficult questions as to which legal institution would be good at error reduction
and how that institution should proceed.
That markets may help suggests a different mode of response: to improve market
performance.  There are two well known tools: to facilitate comparison shopping by requiring
common terms in consumer contracts to be cast in standard forms; and to require the language in
those forms to be accessible to the average reader.  A possible third tool is to require firms to
provide consumers with bias reducing information.
This paper briefly illustrates these possible policy responses by analyzing how the model
applies to credit card contracts.  Every extant credit card contract could be preferred by every
consumer type, but not every consumer should prefer every contract.  Some companies offer credit
cards with high introductory charges, relatively low monthly interest rates and a variety of ancillary
services.  Other companies offer cards with no initial charges, low interest rates for an introductory
period, high interest rates thereafter and few ancillary services.   Letting income be a rough proxy
for sophistication, sophisticated consumers could prefer the former card because they are likely to
use the services (easier reservations at expensive restaurants and clubs, for example) and are32Put more precisely, if C(L) is the total cost of a loan, then C(L) = r + tc where r is the
interest rate and tc are transaction costs.  Then C(L)card may be less then C(L)bank though rcard >
rbank if tccard << tcbank.
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relatively indifferent to the interest rate on an outstanding balance, which these consumers plausibly
expect never to have.  This credit card contract would be an Xs contract.
The stripped down version with no initial charges and high later rates could appeal to both
sophisticated and naive types, however.  A consumer who does not make errors and who is not
interested in the ancillary services could prefer this contract for two reasons.  First, it is costless to
make.  Second, though nominal credit card interest rates are high relative to other credit sources, the
total cost of a credit card loan may be lower than the total cost of alternate financial sources because
credit card borrowing has low transaction costs.  The debtor gets the money without providing the
lender with a credit history or income and employment data, or having an interview.
32   A self aware
error prone consumer also could prefer the stripped down card because of the high later interest rate. 
This consumer wants to make future borrowing difficult because she knows she is likely otherwise
to borrow too much.  Agreeing to a contract that requires high rates and substantial late fees thus can
be a type of pre-commitment: the excessive cost of excessive borrowing can deter the consumer
from deviating from her financial plan.
The stripped down credit card also could be regarded as a naive contract, however.  To see
why, consider a consumer who commonly makes two cognitive mistakes: she discounts the future
hyperbolically and she is overconfident.  Weakness of will leads her, in a later period, to spend a
larger fraction of her income than she planned to spend.  To do this, she uses her credit card to
borrow, mistakenly believing that she will promptly repay.  The stripped down credit card may be
considered an Xn contract because the card can disadvantage these naive types.  The ease of making33See Bar Gill (2004).  Credit card defaults increased substantially in the 1990s but the
cause apparently was lower default costs rather than a worsening of card holder risk profiles (i.e.,
more naive consumers making contracts).  See Gross and Souleles (2002).  These results do not
speak to the question whether too many naive consumers had already been borrowing under the
Xn credit card contract.
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the contract together with the low initial interest rate lures the naive consumer into the arrangement
and the later high rate exploits her.
33 
To summarize, sophisticated consumers generally prefer the Xs card, but some of these
consumers will borrow under the Xn card and more of them would do so if firms set the introductory
charge for Xs too high.  Naive consumers commonly prefer the Xn card but some could come to
prefer the Xs card with its low monthly rate if the introductory charge fell sufficiently.  Since all
consumer types can prefer all card types, no type should be banned.   This market would be
performing poorly, however, if too many naive consumers borrowed under the Xn card and if the
prices for both contract types were too high.
If good and bad contracts are partly person relative, there is a question how the regulator
would know when to intervene.  The model suggests that problems may exist if particular contract
types sold at widely disparate prices.   Considerable price dispersion indicates that some consumers
are paying supracompetitive prices.  Also, considerable price dispersion suggests that too few
consumers comparison shop.  The less comparison shopping there is, the more likely it is that the
naive contract is profitable to sell.  
The state could attempt to improve the functioning of a badly performing credit card market
by requiring common terms in all credit card contracts, not only the annual percentage rate, to be
quoted in standard, easy to understand language.  This would facilitate comparison shopping by all
consumers both for contract types and for low rates.  Regarding the third possible market improving34Jolls and Sunstein (2004), at 40-46, discuss the need for and the potential efficacy of
providing consumers with information of this type.
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response, a credit card company could be required to present consumers with a short description of
default rates together with a statement that not every borrower can be above average (that consumers
are better advised to consider themselves average than good).  Because some persons are better able
to absorb narrative than to evaluate statistics, an alternative disclosure mode would have firms
providing consumers with scenario information: stories about persons who got in over their heads. 
Either form of disclosure could reduce consumer naivety by moderating any overconfidence bias.
34   
When naivety falls, market performance improves.
None of these responses guarantees that only good contracts will be offered at competitive
prices.  But since it would be a mistake to ban any of these contract types, and since correcting the
biases that may cause some consumers to borrow excessively under them would be extraordinarily
difficult, focusing on the competitive process seems a promising policy option.  Markets may be
easier to improve than people.37
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